






Protected, but also Jeopardised by Criminal Law?
Abstract
The paper explores the notion of human dignity in law in general and in criminal law in 
particular, it examines whether human dignity is a legal interest protected by criminal law 
(e.g., in cases of criminalisation of reproductive cloning and acts of racism), and it reflects 
upon how criminal law may jeopardise the human dignity of perpetrators, particularly in 








































morally  rejected.2 Thus,  the  artificial  termination  of  pregnancy  at  an  early 
stage (up to 3 months into pregnancy) with the consent of the expecting wo-
man and  in a medically safe environment  is  legally valid under Greek  law 
(Art. 304 § 4 GPC3). For some social groups, however, it is far from being 
morally indifferent or morally acceptable, while some others would morally 
reject it at a glance. In order for law to facilitate its enforcement, it is only 
natural that it tries to align it with morality as much as possible.
This brings us to the last fundamental clarification of criminal law in particu-
lar.  Criminal  law  is  admittedly  the harshest mechanism that states employ 






law is closely linked to the protection of fundamental rights and the rule of 
law.
II. The notion of human dignity in law in general and 


































III. Protecting human dignity 
      as a legal interest by criminal law
According to Article 2 § 1 of the Greek Constitution, the state’s primary obli-
gation is to respect and protect the value of the human being. Therefore, and 
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Unequivocally,  the extent  to which  fertilised ova consist of human genetic 
material and incorporate the value of their genitors’ personality is the extent 
to which they should be treated differently from the rest of things. To name 
but one example, they cannot be sold. However, fertilised ova cannot be re-
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to human reproduction after its unification with relevant components or under 
specific conditions, and at the preservation of the above attribute in a way 




















































IV. Human dignity jeopardised by criminal law?
In what  follows,  it  is useful  to extend our  focus  to another very  important 
aspect  which  can  provide  a  holistic  view  on  the  real  extent  of  the  protec-
tion of human dignity by the means of criminal law. This cannot be achieved 
by merely documenting  the  respective extent of criminalisation of  relevant 














ation) against  the human dignity of offenders  that  reasonably receive more 
focused attention.
As has already been mentioned,  for  law in general and for criminal  law in 







legislator directly bends the relevant protective milieu via regulatory provi-
sions or, at any rate, tolerates the possibility of inflicting the value of a human 
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for  the value of  the human being,35 criminals  included?36 When police ex-

































































termeasure  against  organised  (and,  therefore,  complex  and  intricate)  crime 
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zaštićeno, ali i ugroženo kaznenim pravom?
Sažetak
Rad istražuje pojam ljudskoga dostojanstva u pravu općenito i kaznenom pravu napose, odnos-
no ispituje je li ljudsko dostojanstvi pravni interes zaštićen kaznenim pravom (npr. u slučajevi-
ma kriminalizacije reproduktivnog kloniranja i rasističkih činova) te reflektira o tome kako kaz-
neno pravo može ugroziti ljudsko dostojanstvo počinitelja, osobito u slučajevima kažnjavanja 






geschützt, aber auch gefährdet durch Strafrecht?
Zusammenfassung
Die Arbeit erforscht den Begriff der Menschenwürde im Recht generell und vornehmlich im 
Strafrecht bzw. untersucht, ob die Menschenwürde ein durch das Strafrecht geschütztes recht-
liches Interesse repräsentiert (beispielsweise in den Fällen der Kriminalisierung von repro-
duktivem Klonen und rassistischen Akten). Des Weiteren reflektiert die Arbeit darüber, wie das 
Strafrecht die Menschenwürde des Täters in Gefahr bringen kann, insbesondere in den Fällen 





La dignité humaine: 
protégée, mais aussi menacée par le droit pénal?
Résumé
Ce travail examine le concept de dignité humaine dans le droit en général et dans le droit pénal 
en particulier, c’est-à-dire qu’il pose la question de savoir si la dignité humaine est un intérêt 
de droit protégée par le droit pénal (p. ex. dans les situations de criminalisation du clonage re-
productif et dans les actes racistes) et réfléchit sur la manière dont le droit pénal peut menacer 
la dignité humaine du délinquant, particulièrement dans des situations où les peines sont liées 
à la prise de drogues et lors d’arrestations policières.
Mots-clés
dignité humaine, droit pénal, répression criminelle, abus de la médecine, prise de drogues, droit et 
morale, clonage reproductif, racisme, arrestation policière
